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Dziura: The Last Word on Festo

THE LAST WORD ON FESTO
I.

INTRODUCTION

A Patent "is a property right; and like any property right, its
boundaries should be clear." 1 While a patent affords the inventor
the opportunity to describe what he regards as his invention using
his own terminology, a patent also must afford to the public
adequate notice as to the objective meaning of the claims.2 One
would think that in such a sophisticated legal system as the United
States offers, the rules of law would clearly resolve the clash
between the needs of the public and the interests of inventors.
More importantly, one would think that in a country concerned so
much with protection of private property ownership and protection
of the interested public, drawing up clear, predictable, and stable
boundaries around patents should not be a problem. That clarity
has not happened, however. Patent documents continue to be a
source of controversy with continuous litigation from the very day
they are granted. This controversy is prevalent in the two areas
that really should not be a subject of any ambiguity, let alone
serious problems, as they are areas that define ownership rights in
a patent document and thus affect virtually everything else that
follows the grant of a patent. These areas of controversy are claim
construction3 and the doctrine of equivalents, along with its
1. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
730 (2002).
2. Id. at 731 ("A patent holder should know what he owns, and the public
should know what he does not. For this reason, the patent laws require
inventors to describe their work in 'full, clear, concise, and exact terms .... '").
3. Before litigation begins in any patent infringement suit, claims in the
patent at issue are construed by a judge during a Markman hearing. Then the
case proceeds to trial where the jury, using the meaning of the claims from the
Markman hearing, determines the issue of infringement. Because claim
construction is a question of law, when the case is appealed from a district court,
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limitation-prosecution history estoppel.
However, unlike in
claim construction where, at least with respect to controversial
court opinions, the dust has somewhat settled in recent years,5 the
doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel
jurisprudence has remained tumultuous. The Festo saga,6 where
litigation spanned over 19 years, provides the best example of this
turmoil.

the Federal Circuit determines the meaning of the claims de novo without
paying any deference to findings of the Markman hearing. If the Federal Circuit
decides that the claims were not construed correctly during the Markman
hearing, the case is sent back to the district court for a new trial on infringement,
unless of course the Federal Circuit decides that the case would have come out
the same way on infringement even with the new claim construction. Even
though this procedure does not appear out of the ordinary, as many issues in
different areas of law are reviewed de novo and, if overturned, sent back to the
lower court for a new trial, the controversy in claim construction is caused by
the extremely high reversal rate of lower court's claim constructions by the
Federal Circuit. Various studies have put that reversal rate at least 34.5%. See
Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More
Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 231 (2005) (reporting claim
construction reversal of 34.5% at the district court level); Christian A. Chu,
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1089 (2001) (reporting reversal of 36.6% of all
cases when summary affirmances are taken into account). With such high
reversal rate one can understand the uncertainty among practitioners. The high
rate essentially means that neither the patentees, nor the interested public can
truly ascertain the meaning of any patent until the Federal Circuit has had its say
on the issue of claim construction.
4. Issues in the application of the doctrine of equivalents are the topic of this
paper and will be addressed in upcoming sections.
5. Even though there have been calls to change the law with respect to the de
novo review and afford deference to the findings of the district court judge, the
last major court opinion on the issue occurred in 1998. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Since Cybor, the focus on fixing
the problem shifted from changing the standard of review to other avenues as
well, such as fixing the problem at the district court level by enhancing district
judges' knowledge and efficiency in these highly technical patent cases. See
H.R. 34, 110th Cong. (2007) (providing for creation of a pilot program to
enhance the expertise at the district court level).
6. When talking about litigation involved in this case in general terms (i.e.
the entire lineage of cases), without reference to any particular court's decision,
I will simply refer to it as "Festo." When referring to Festo Corporation, as a
party in the lawsuit, I will refer to it as Festo (not italicized).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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The lawsuit started as a multi-million dollar7 judgment for the
plaintiff (Festo) in 1994. That district court decision was affirmed
by the Federal Circuit in 1995 in Festo 1,8 vacated by the Supreme
Court in 1997 in Festo II, 9 reversed by the Federal Circuit in 2000
in Festo Ill,O and vacated again by the Supreme Court in 2002 in
Festo IV." On remand, first the Circuit, in Festo V,' 2 and then the
district court, in Festo VI,' 3 put the final daggers in Festo's case.
More important than the ultimate fate of the litigants, however,
were the rules of law pronounced by these courts, starting with the
"complete bar" decision in Festo III and ending with the "Festo
presumption" and three exceptions to that presumption articulated
by the Supreme Court in Festo IV. These rules not only affected
the outcome of the litigation, but set precedent for the whole patent
bar to follow.
On July 2007, in Festo VII, the Federal Circuit took on the case
again. This time, its decision did not depart from the guidelines
set by the Supreme Court in Festo IV and continued a victorious
streak for the proponents of a flexible, case-by-case approach with
respect to the application of prosecution history estoppel as
favored by the Supreme Court. 4 That was the easy part. What the
Federal Circuit struggled with was the application of the test
7. The total jury award for Festo was $4,739,183 ($4,322,456 in damages
and $416,727 in prejudgment interest). Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
8. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinsoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857 (Fed.

Cir. 1995).
9. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinsoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 520 U.S. 1111
(1997).
10. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinsoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
11. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinsoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722

(2002).
12. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinsoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359

(Fed. Cir. 2003).
13. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinsoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 2005 WL
1398528 (D. Mass. June 10, 2005).
14. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinsoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,

724 (2002) ("[W]e have consistently applied the doctrine in a flexible way, not a
rigid one. We have considered what equivalents were surrendered during the
prosecution of the patent, rather than imposing a complete bar that resorts to the
very literalism the equivalents rule is designed to overcome.").
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

3

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6

408

DEPA UL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW

[Vol. XVIII:405

articulated in Festo IV with respect to determining whether a
particular equivalent was foreseeable at the time of the narrowing
amendment. This struggle was due to the unique facts in Festo,
namely newly discovered properties of the prior art device in
question which were unknown at the time of a narrowing
amendment. Nevertheless, the majority seems to have reached a
correct decision, specifically with respect to reiterating the timing
of determining equivalency in foreseeability analysis.
Part II of this article is an overview of the most important
concepts in patent infringement jurisprudence, including literal
infringement and the doctrine of equivalents. Part III provides the
factual background to the dispute in Festo and outlines the most
important decisions in the saga, leading up to the most recent
decision in Festo VII. Most importantly, it will present the Federal
Circuit's "complete bar" ruling, handed down in Festo II,and the
most recent Supreme Court's opinion in Festo IV, reversing that
"complete bar" and reinstating the case-by-case approach. Part IV
familiarizes the reader with the most important aspects of the
majority and dissenting opinions of Festo VII. Part V presents the
reason for the apparent split between the dissent and the majority.
Part VI will predict the immediate impact Festo VII will have on
future cases. Finally, part VII will reconcile public policy
concerns with Festo.
This note analyzes only the "magnetizable sleeve" limitation of
Festo's patent. It does not talk about the "sealing ring" limitation,
because the Federal Circuit, in its latest opinion, reached its
holding based on the "magnetizable sleeve" limitation only and
felt that it was unnecessary to dwell on the "sealing ring
limitation.""1

II. BACKGROUND

The boundaries, or "metes and bounds" of any patent document
are established by the claims;16 the claims describe the "patentable
elements of the invention."17 When infringement is alleged, the
15. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1382.
16. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN.L. REv. 955, 958 (2007).
17. Jared R. Clark, Promoting the Progress for Some: Why Independent
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first step in the analysis is to determine the scope of the patent
claims.' 8 This is done by a judge, usually prior to a trial on the
merits, in a specialized proceeding called a Markman hearing.' 9
Literal infringement of the claims occurs only when the accused
device "includes each and every element" of the patented device.20
"This requirement is known as the "all elements rule." 2' Patent
infringement requires only that the accused device infringe a single
patented claim. To avoid literal infringement, the accused device
need only lack a single element of the claim in question.23
However, even when a necessary claim limitation is not literally
infringed, a patentee may still prove infringement through the
application of the doctrine of equivalents.24 Under the doctrine,
infringement occurs where an element literally missing from the
patented device is replaced with an equivalent element in the
accused device. 25 The policy behind the doctrine of equivalents is
to "prevent the imitation of an otherwise patented invention where
insubstantial changes have been made to circumvent the patent
protection" when literal infringement does not apply.26 As such,
Inventors Are the First to Suffer as the Doctrine of Equivalents Fades Away, 52
S.D. L. Rev. 355, 359 (2007).
18. Id. at 364.
19. Id.
20. Allison & Lemley, supra note 14, at 958-59.
21. John M. Benassi et al., Claim Construction and Proving Infringement:
Impact of Phillips and Festo and Their Progeny, 910 PLI/PAT 57, 91 (2007).
Elements refer to limitations within claims of a patent. Id. Elements may be a
single or a multiple limitation that makes a "single component of the claimed
invention." Id.
22. Clark, supra note 10, at 365-66.
23. Id. at 365.
24. Benassi, supra note 19, at 92.
25. Id.
26. Clark, supra note 10, at 366. That principle was voiced by the Supreme
Court from the very first time that it addressed the doctrine. See, e.g., Winans v.
Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 343 (1853) (stating that "[t]he exclusive right to the
thing patented is not secured, if the public are at liberty to make substantial
copies of it, varying its form or proportions"); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (explaining that "[t]he
essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud on a patent"); Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, 535 U.S. 722, 723 (2002)
(recognizing that the doctrine of equivalents ensures appropriate incentives for
innovation).
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when analyzing the facts of the case, courts look for
"circumstances [where] the change [in the new device] was so
insubstantial that the ...

invocation of the doctrine of equivalents

was justified.""
The doctrine of equivalents is a concept that is deeply
entrenched in the United States patent system. The first Supreme
Court decision that involved its express application was Winans v.
Denmead in 1853.28 In Winans, the plaintiff held a patent for
making a railroad car for transporting coal and "all other heavy
articles in lumps."29 The patent specified that the "upper part" of
the railroad car to be "cylindrical, and the lower part in the form of
a frustrum of a cone." 3 The alleged infringer produced railroad
cars that had octagonal and pyramidal shapes.3 In reversing the
lower court finding of no infringement, which seemed to have
been based on the fact that the accused device did not literally
infringe the patent,32 the Supreme Court failed to articulate the
specific test that is used to determine equivalency today, but held
that the issue in these cases is whether the accused device involves
a change of form or substance.33 The Court explained:
It is generally true, when a patentee describes a
machine, and then claims it as described, that he is
understood to intend to claim, and does by law
actually cover, not only the precise forms he has
described, but all other forms which embody his
27. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610.
28. Winans, 56 U.S. 330.
29. Id. at 339.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 332.
32. Specifically the lower court judge instructed the jury:
That while the patent is good for what [is] described therein, a
conical body, in whole or in part, supported in any of the

modes indicated for a mode of sustaining a conical body on a
carriage or truck, and drawing the same, and to those
principles which are due alone to conical vehicles, and not to
rectilinear bodies, and it being admitted that the defendants'

car was entirely rectilinear, that there was no infringement of
the plaintiffs patent.

Id. at 336.
33. Id. at 343.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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invention; it being a familiar rule that, to copy the
principle or more of operation described, is an
infringement, although such copy should be totally
unlike the original in form or proportions.34
In the years after Winans, courts developed two separate tests
for finding equivalency: (1) the function/way/result test and (2) the
insubstantial differences test.35 The function/way/result test, also
known as the "triple identity" test, focuses "on the function served
by a particular claim element, the way that element serves that
function, and the result thus obtained."36 The insubstantial
differences test asks whether the changes between the accused
element and the claim limitation in the patent are insubstantial.37
Courts, however, are not required to use any particular test in any
particular case or circumstance.38 This is because, regardless of
the particular test used, the essential inquiry in doctrine of
equivalence cases always focuses on "whether the element in the
accused device performs substantially the same function in
34. Winans, 56 U.S. at 342. The court reasoned that:
Where [the substance and the form of the invention] are
separable; where the whole substance of the invention may be
copied in a different form, it is the duty of courts and juries to
look through the form for the substance of the invention--for
that which entitled the inventor to his patent, and which the
patent was designated to secure; where that is found, there is
an infringement; and it is not a defence, [sic] that it is
embodied in a form not described, and in terms claimed by the
patentee.
Id. at 343.
35. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39
(1997).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 40.
38. See id. The court reasoned that "linguistic framework . . . is less
important than whether the test is probative of the essential inquiry." Id. The
issue in these cases should be whether "the accused product or process contain
elements identical or equivalent to each claimed element of the patented
invention" because "the role played by each element in the context of the
specific patent claim will thus inform the inquiry as to whether a substitute
element matches the function, way, and result of the claimed element, or
whether the substitute element plays a role substantially different from the
claimed element." Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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substantially the same way to obtain the same result as the claim
limitation."3 9
Furthermore, each of the tests has its own
shortcomings and focusing strictly on one over the other would
ultimately take away from the correct analysis of equivalency.40
Prosecution history estoppel is a limitation to the doctrine of
equivalents.4' It requires that "a patent be interpreted in light of
the proceedings in the PTO during the application process. ' ' 42
Specifically, when applicable, it "precludes the patentee from

reclaiming, via the doctrine of equivalents,
relinquished during the prosecution.

responsible

for

arguments

and

' 43

subject matter

It thus holds the patentee

amendments

made

during

prosecution in order to obtain a patent." Although much more
could be written about prosecution history estoppel in this section,
because the doctrine developed so many wrinkles solely because
of Festo, further explanation of estoppel will be reserved for the
remaining sections.

39. Id; see also Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S.
605 (1950); Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30 (1929); Cantrell
v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689 (1896); Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120 (1877);
AquaTex Indus., Inc. v. Techniche Solutions, 419 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
40. The court explained "that, while the triple identity test may be suitable
for analyzing mechanical devices, it often provides a poor framework for
analyzing other products and processes. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39-40.
On the other hand, the insubstantial differences test offers little additional
guidance as to what might render any given difference 'insubstantial."' Id. at 40.
41. Benassi, supra note 14, at 93. There are three other important limitations
to the doctrine of equivalents: (1) "dedication to the public domain" limitation
which dedicates to public "any technological equivalent that was disclosed but
not claimed in the application"; and (2) limitation that prevents the patentee
from using the doctrine of equivalents to recapture what is a part of prior art.
42. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinsoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,

733 (2002).
43. Benassi, supra note 14, at 94.
44. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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III. FEsTo-THE BEGINNINGS, THE MIDDLE, AND THE LATEST
SUPREME COURT DECISION

A. Factualbackground

In 1981, Dr. Stoll (the predecessor to Festo) filed a patent
application for "Magnetically Coupled Arrangement for a Driving
and a Driven Member."45 The application was for a "small gap
magnetically coupled rodless cylinder."46 The invention disclosed
"a sleeve" that surrounded the "outside of the driven member and
[was] the casing that encloses the magnets."47 Independent claim48
1 did not contain any information regarding a sleeve; however,
dependent claim4 9 8 claimed such sleeve was made out of a
45. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368,
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
46. Id.
A magnetically coupled cylinder is a previously known device
that contains a piston that is forced through a cylinder and is
magnetically coupled to a driven member or driven assembly
(which is attached to a carriage that can move goods ....
Thus when the piston moves through the cylinder, the
magnetic force moves the driven member, which moves the
attached carriage .... The invention claimed in the 125
patent is a "small gap" magnetically coupled rodless cylinder,
meaning that the gap between the piston as the driven member
is kept as small as possible so that the magnetic coupling force
is particularly strong.

Id.
47. Id. The patented device also contained sealing rings at either end of the
piston. Id. The sealing rings also "wipe impurities from the inside of the
cylinder." Id.
48. "Independent claims are those that can be read and interpreted without
looking to other claims; they are claims that stand on their own accord." Clark,
supra note 10, at 362.
49. A dependent claim cannot stand on its own and must incorporate claim(s)
to which it refers. It must also add an additional limitation to the subject matter
that is claimed. This requirement is encoded in the statute which reads: "[A]
claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth
and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed." 35 U.S.C. §
112 (2006). "A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by
reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers." Id.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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"magnetizable material."5 Dr. Stoll's application was rejected
initially, partly because the examiner found that claims 4-12 were
in an improper multiple dependent form in violation of Section
112 of the Patent Act.5' In response to the rejection, Dr. Stoll
submitted two prior art "large gap" rodless cylinder patents, one of
which disclosed a "sleeve made out of non-magnetic material. 52
He then submitted a short statement distinguishing the German
patents from his application. 3 He amended further his own
application by substituting independent claim 1 and dependent
claims 4 and 8 with a new independent claim 1.14 His new claim
contained a limitation that required that the "cylindrical sleeve [be]
made of a magnetizable material." 55 Dr. Stoll did not, however,
explain the purpose of the amendment, he did not explain the
reasoning behind the amendment and he also did not mention
anything about the sleeve element in his response. 6 The examiner
allowed these amended claims."
50. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1372.
51. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., No. Civ. A. 881814-MA, 1993 WL 1510657, at *12 (D. Mass. Apr. 27, 1993). Section 112
contains the guidelines in regards to multiple dependent claims:
A claim in multiple dependent form shall contain a reference,
in the alternative only, to more than one claim previously set
forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter
claimed. A multiple dependent claim shall not serve as a basis
for any other multiple dependent claim. A multiple dependent
claim shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the
limitations of the particular claim in relation to which it is
being considered.
35 U.S.C. § 112. Although the court did not explain specifically the exact
reasons for impropriety, from the limited information provided, it seems that
claim 4, which was a multiple dependent claim, improperly served as basis for
claim 8, which was another multiple dependent claims. One would have to
analyze the original patent application to determine what was exactly wrong
with the other claims.
52. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1373.
53. Festo, 1993 WL 1510657, at *12.
54. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1373.
55. Id at 1374. The new claim also replaced "sealing rings" with "first
sealing rings located axially outside said guide rings." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. These amendments were allowed with minor changes made by the
examiner. Id. The court omitted discussion of these changes stating that "they
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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Respondent, Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (SMC)
also produced "a magnetically coupled rodless cylinder that
contained a "driven member surrounded by a sleeve. ' 58 The SMC
device differed from Dr. Stoll's patented device because SMC's
device was made of non-magnetizable material, specifically
aluminum alloy. 9
In August 1988, Festo sued SMC for infringement of its patent
(the '125 Patent).60 As an initial matter, the parties conceded that
because two of the claim limitations 6 required by the '125 patent
were not present in SMC's device, SMC's device did not literally
infringe Festo's patent.6 2 Nonetheless, Festo argued in its motion
for summary judgment that SMC's device infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents.63 SMC contended that there was no
infringement through the doctrine of equivalents because the triple
identity test was not satisfied. 6' SMC also argued that prosecution
history estoppel precluded the application of the doctrine of
equivalents in this case.65
The District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that
prosecution history estoppel did not apply; therefore, application
of the doctrine of equivalents was not precluded.66 The case went

[were] not pertinent [to the case]." Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. There was another difference between the devices.

Namely,

respondent's device contained two guide rings, as opposed to only one in
petitioner's patented device. Id.
60. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1374.

61. These two claim limitations in question were: (1) sleeve made of an
magnetizable material, and (2) first sealing rings located axially outside the
guide rings. See id.

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Both sides made these arguments on motions for summary judgment.

See id.
66. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1374 (citing Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., No. Civ. A. 88-1814-MA, 1994 WL 1743984, at *4 (D. Mass.
Feb. 3, 1994)). The district court specifically found that "there [was] nothing in
the record .

.

. to indicate that the limitation of a magnetizable sleeve was

necessary to distinguish the claimed invention over prior art" and thus the
prosecution history estoppel should not apply." Id. (quoting Festo, 1994 WL
1743984, at *4).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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to trial and a jury found that SMC infringed Festo's patent under
the doctrine of equivalents.67 The Federal Circuit affirmed in
Festo L.68
In Festo II the Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated, and remanded for the Federal Circuit to consider WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,69 and to apply that

decision to the facts of Festo.7" In Warner-Jenkinson,the Supreme
Court held that only amendments made during prosecution history
related to patentability trigger the application of prosecution
history estoppel. 7 The Court, however, placed the burden on the
patentee to establish that the amendment, when present, was not
made for reasons of patentability.7 2 Where the patentee fails to
meet this burden, the court will "presume that the purpose behind
the required amendment is such that prosecution history estoppel
would apply."73 This presumption was important in the context of
the Festo patent because Dr. Stoll did not provide any reasons for
amending the claims in his application."
B. Festo III-The "Complete Bar"
On remand, after considering the issues from Warner-Jenkinson,
an en bane panel of the Federal Circuit held that for purposes of
prosecution history estoppel, a "'substantial reason related to
patentability' is not limited to overcoming prior art, but includes

67. Id.
68. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857
(Fed. Cir. 1995). The Federal Circuit held that there was no reversible error on
the district court level. Id. at 864. The court reasoned that "[t]aking note of the
substantial evidence of technologic identity of function, way, and result in the
circumstances of actual use wherein the leakage of magnetic flux from the
cylinder was small, and the disputed facts underlying the issue of estoppel, we
conclude that the judgment of infringement of the Stoll patent must be
sustained." Id.
69. Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
70. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.. v. Festo Corp., 520 U.S. 1111
(1997).
71. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 19.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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other reasons related to the statutory requirements for a patent."75
Hence, prosecution history estoppel could be used with Dr. Stoll's
Section 112 amendments and as a result, the court reversed the
judgment of infringement.76 More importantly the court held that
when such an amendment is made by the patentee, the amendment
creates a "complete bar" for equivalents-the patentee gives up all
of the equivalents with respect to the subject matter narrowed on
amendment. "
C. Festo IV-The Supreme Court's Response to the
"Complete Bar"
Festo petitioned to the Supreme Court for review of the Festo III
decision. The petition was granted and on May 28, 2002, the
Supreme Court issued its second opinion in the case.78 The Court
again vacated and remanded the Federal Circuit's decision.7 9 It
agreed with the Federal Circuit that prosecution history estoppel
was not limited to narrowing amendments in response to prior
art. 8' Hence, estoppel may be triggered by "any amendment that
narrows a claim to comply with the Patent Act.""
The Court
reasoned that, at least in instances where absence of an amendment
would render the claimed subject matter unpatentable, the patentee

75. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558,
563 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
76. Id.at 591.
77. Id. at 569. In addition, the Federal Circuit held that "voluntary
amendments are treated the same as other amendments for purposes of
prosecution history estoppel" and that unexplained amendments are not entitled

to any range of equivalents. Id. at 569, 578.
78. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722
(2002).

79. Id. at 742.
80. Id. at 735-36.
81. Id. at 730. The Court listed some of the requirements of the Patent act
that had to be satisfied before a patent could be granted. See id. at 736. They

included the requirements of sections 101-103 requiring that the subject matter
claimed be useful, novel and not obvious. Id. The Court also stated that the
patent application must also conform to section 112 of the Patent Act, that is "it
must describe, enable, and set forth the best mode of carrying out the invention.

Id. Furthermore, specification must include what is claimed. Id.
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should not be able to recapture what had been given up.82 The
Court, however, did not articulate a complete list of amendments
that could be related to patentability and thus trigger the
application of prosecution history estoppel.83 Furthermore, the
Court explained that even some amendments made for reasons
other than to comply with the Patent Act might still trigger
estoppel.14 In the end, the Court held that Festo's Section 112
amendments were related to patentability and therefore triggered
the application of prosecution history estoppel.85
Most
importantly, the Court held that the owner of a patent does not
have a defense from prosecution history estoppel where "the
original application once embraced the purported equivalent but
the patentee narrowed his claims to obtain the patent or to protect
its validity." 6 This was particularly important to the case at bar
because Festo's patent had included an SMC-type of sleeve before
the narrowing amendment.8 7
The Supreme Court, however, did not uphold the second part of
Festo III, regarding the "complete bar" of any equivalents in
situations where claims are narrowed.88 Specifically, the Court
held that "there is no reason why a narrowing amendment should
82. Id. at 735.
83. Id.
84. Festo, 535 U.S. at 735. The court explained that in these situations,
"prosecution history may rebut the inference that a thing not described was
indescribable. Id. at 736.
85. Id. at 737. The court specifically held that such an amendment is in fact
"necessary and narrows" the scope of the claims "even if only for the purpose of
better description," because that is one of the conditions for patentability. Id.
86. Id. at 734. The court reasoned that doctrine of equivalents is based on
"language's inability to capture the essence of the innovation." Id. When the
original, or earlier application, however, described the very same element that
was later narrowed, and is now sought to be reclaimed through the doctrine, the
doctrine is undercut because there was no such proven inability to describe. Id.
87. This is because the original, independent claim 1 did not contain a
limitation with respect to the type of sleeve that was required for the patented
device. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d
1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
88. Festo, 535 U.S. at 737. In its decision the Federal Circuit conceded that
its holding was a departure from precedent but stated that a "flexible bar rule is
unworkable because it leads to excessive uncertainty and burdens legitimate
innovation." Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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be deemed to relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at the time of
the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation of what was
surrendered." 9 The Court emphasized that its precedent has
always applied the doctrine in a flexible fashion and then
cautioned overturning well grounded principles and "disrupt[ing]
the settled expectations of the inventing community."9 ° To resolve
the issue, the Court reiterated the holding from Warner-Jenkinson
and held that the balance between the interests advanced by the
Federal Circuit's complete bar-the interest in certainty-and the
interests advanced by the flexible bar-the legitimate expectations
of inventors-is resolved best with a flexible approach by placing
the burden on the patentee to show that by amending the claims he
did not surrender the equivalent at issue.9' In the absence of such
explanation, the court will presume that the amendment was made
in order to make a particular claim patentable, and "prosecution
history [estoppel] would bar the application of the doctrine of
equivalents."92 The court, however, emphasized that as with any
presumption, the patentee may rebut it.93 Thus, the Court
expressly overruled the complete bar applied by Festo Ill.
Specifically, the presumption may be rebutted where:
The equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the
time of the application; the rationale underlying the
amendment may bear no more than a tangential
relation to the equivalent in question; or there may
be some other reason suggesting that the patentee
could not reasonably be expected to have described
the insubstantial substitute in question.94
In other words, a patentee must show that "the amendment
cannot reasonably be viewed as surrendering a particular

89. Id. at 738.
90. Id. at 739. Specifically, the Court was concerned with the "legitimate

expectations of investors in their property". Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 739-40.
93. Id. at 740-41.
94. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740-41.
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equivalent."95
On remand, in Festo V, the Federal Circuit first stated that in a
determination of whether a patentee rebutted the presumption,
many relevant factors can be present; thus, "rebuttal criteria"
should be analyzed on a "case by case basis."96 It held, however,
that Festo could not rebut the presumption with respect to the
"tangential relation" or "some other reason" exceptions advanced
by the Supreme Court.97 With respect to whether Festo could
prove that, at the time of the amendments, the equivalents were
unforeseeable, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district
court for a determination on that issue.98
After a two-day bench trial, in Festo VI, the district court held
95. Id. at 740. Thus, "[tihe patentee must show that at the time of the
amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have
drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed [a particular] equivalent."
Id. at 741.
96. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359,
1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Writing for the court, Judge Lourie stated that
"[b]ecause we cannot anticipate all of the circumstances in which a patentee
might rebut the presumption of surrender, we believe that discussion of the
relevant factors encompassed by each of the rebuttal criteria is best left to
development on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1368.
97. Id. at 1363-64. "[The tangential relation criterion] asks whether the
reason for the narrowing amendment was peripheral, or not directly relevant."
Id. at 1369. Thus, when an equivalent is present in the prior art and the patentee
makes an amendment to avoid that prior art, he will not be able to rebut the
presumption using "tangential relation" criterion, because it is clear that in such
circumstances amendment is "central to allowance of the claim." Id. On the
other hand, "other reason" criterion determines whether there may have been
"some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be
expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question ... such as
the shortcomings of the language." Id. at 1370. Here, similarly, patentee will
not rebut the presumption if the equivalent was present in the prior art because
"there can be no other reason the patentee could not have described the
substitute in question." Id. at 1370.
98. Id. at 1364. Before reaching any decisions on the substantive issues in
the case, the Federal Circuit reiterated what parts of its vacated decision
remained alive. See id. at 1366. Specifically the court reiterated that: (1) "a
'voluntary' amendment may give rise to prosecution history estoppel"; (2) "a
narrowing amendment is made for substantial reasons related to patentability
when the record does not reveal the reason for the amendment"; and (3) "a
patentee's failure to overcome the Warner-Jenkinson presumption gives rise to
the new Festo presumption of surrender." Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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for SMC.99 It found that the equivalent in question, SMC's device,
"would have been foreseeable to one of ordinary skill in the art at
the time ... the narrowing amendments [were made]."

IV. FESTO VII-THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S

'

LAST WORD ON FESTO

A. Festo'sArgument
Festo appealed the district court's decision.' 1 The sole issue on
appeal was whether Festo could prove that SMC's device was
unforeseeable to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time when
Dr. Stoll made his amendments.' 2 Festo's main argument was
that the determination of foreseeability of an equivalent must be
made using the "function/way/result" test at the time of the
amendment.0 3 Festo urged the court to adopt its foreseeability test
which turned on "whether the proven equivalent would have been
foreseeable to a person of ordinary skill in the art to accomplish
the claimed invention, i.e., perform the same function in
substantially the same way to achieve the same result, looking only
at the information available at the time of the amendment."'' 0 4
Festo concluded that under this test, the equivalent in questionthe aluminum sleeve-was not foreseeable, because one of
ordinary skill in the art did not know that an aluminum sleeve
could perform the "magnetic shielding function."'0 5 Thus, Festo
argued, prosecution history estoppel did not preclude application
of the doctrine of equivalents to the claim at issue and that "it
should be able to capture the unclaimed equivalents."' 6

99. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., No. Civ. A. 881814-PBS, 2005 WL 1398528, at *9 (D. Mass. June 10, 2005).

100. Id. at*1.
101. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368,
1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

1377.
1378.
1378-79.
1379.
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B. Majority Opinion
The Federal Circuit, in a split panel decision, disagreed." 7 It
explicitly stated that determination of foreseeability does not
involve the application of the function/way/result test or the
insubstantial differences test.0 8 The court held that "an alternative
is foreseeable if it is disclosed in the pertinent prior art in the field
of the invention."'0 9 The court offered several explanations for its
holding. First, it stated that precedent, including the Supreme
Court's opinion in Festo IV, was consistent with its ruling. 1 ' In
the court's mind, "[t]he patentee, as the author of the claim
language, may be expected to draft claims encompassing readily
known equivalents."'' . Therefore, it follows that "if the alleged
equivalent were known in the prior art in the field of the invention,
it certainly should have been foreseeable at the time of the
amendment."" 2
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the function/way/result test
aids in determination whether the doctrine of equivalents applies
and not whether an equivalent is foreseeable under the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel." 3
The court explained that
acceptance of Festo's test would lead to the disappearance of
prosecution history estoppel as a viable defense to competitors in
most cases." 4 The doctrine would only apply if the applicant,
when amending the claims of his invention, "was aware or should
have been aware" that the broader feature would be an equivalent
to the one in the amended claims." 5 Thus, the only instance when
a competitor could assert a defense of prosecution history estoppel
under such a regime would be when "the alternative was

107. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1379.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1380.
111. Id. (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 740 (2002).
112. Id. (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
344 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted).
113. Festo,493 F.3dat 1380.
114. Id.
115. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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inadvertently omitted and was a candidate for a reissue patent.""' 6
Furthermore, application of the function/way/result test would lead
to inconsistent arguments with respect to equivalency at different
stages of the proceedings. 7
Most importantly, the court thought the test incorrectly invited
determination of equivalency for the purposes of determining
whether prosecution history estoppel applies after, rather than
before, the narrowing amendment. "8 The court stated that when
the alternative is known in the pertinent art before the amendment,
"the applicant should not be able to recapture it simply by
establishing that a property of the equivalent-irrelevant to the
broader claim before the amendment-was relevant but unknown
9
with respect to the objectives of the narrower amended claim.,,''
The Federal Circuit surmised that it was not unfair to charge the
applicant with reasonably knowing that such equivalents were
present in the prior art and with the risk of surrendering this
alternative when a narrowed claim does not include that
equivalent."'2 Thus, the court held that an equivalent is foreseeable
"even if the suitability of the alternative for the particular purposes
defined by the amended claim scope were unknown."' 2 '
By applying this reasoning to the facts of the case, the court held
that the use of a non-magnetizable sleeve "was foreseeable under
116. Id. at 1381.
117. Id. The court explained that, during the infringement stage, a patentee
would first argue that the triple identity test was satisfied to prove infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents and then completely reverse his course by
claiming that the allegedly infringing device was not foreseeable to the one
skilled in the art at the time of the amendment because it did not satisfy the
triple identity test. Id.
118. Id.
119. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1381. The court explained this using a simple
example:
[I]f a claim before amendment broadly claimed a metal
filament for a light bulb but was later amended to avoid prior
art and to specify metal A because of its longevity, the
equivalent metal B, known in the prior art to function as a
bulb filament, is not unforeseeable even through its longevity
was unknown at the time of the amendment.
Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1382.
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the original broader claim."' 22 The court recognized that prior art
disclosed a non-magnetic sleeve.' 2 More importantly, the court
found that Dr. Stoll "recognized the possibility of using a nonmagnetic material for the [device].' 24 Even the original patent
disclosed that the shielding characteristics of the magnetic sleeve
were only beneficial and not necessary to accomplish the
invention. 125
C. Dissent
Judge Newman began her dissent by accusing the majority of
eroding what was left of the doctrine of equivalents.' 26 She
analogized the majority's opinion to the "complete bar" that was
just recently overruled by the Supreme Court in Festo IV.27
Specifically, she stated that the majority "create[ed] new and
incorrect criterion for the measurement of foreseeability" when it
held that "an existing structure need not be recognized or even
recognizable, as an equivalent at the time of the patent application
or amendment, in order to be 'foreseeable' if it is later used as an
equivalent." 128 Accordingly, Judge Newman agreed with Festo
that determination of foreseeability required the applicant to know
whether the equivalent satisfied the "triple identity" or the
"insubstantial differences" tests at the time of the amendment.' 29
Judge Newman agreed that "the technological equivalency," for
purposes of the doctrine of equivalents, should be assessed at
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1382. The court thought so because the original did not require
the sleeve to be made out of magnetizable material. Id. Furthermore, the

applicant himself specified that whether the material for the sleeve was
magnetizable was "a matter of 'choice."' Id. (quoting Pl.'s Pre-Trial Mem. at
91, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushili Co., 493 F.3d 1368 (Fed.

Cir. 2007) (No. 05-1492) ("It is possible to use a magnetizable sleeve or a nonmagnetizable sleeve and the device will work no matter which sleeve material is
chosen .... The choice of the sleeve-material is merely a matter of personal
selection.")).
125. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1383.

126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1383 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1386.
1383.
1385.
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infringement, while foreseeability should be determined at filing of
the application or amendment. 3
However, Judge Newman
thought that the district court committed error by analyzing
foreseeability of the element in question using the information at
the time of the infringement rather than using the information that
was known at the time that the application was filed.' 3 ' She
reasoned that, by agreeing with the district court, the majority
found that the "aluminum alloy shield was retrospectively
foreseeable at the time of the amendment because it later was used
as an equivalent, although it was not known to be equivalent and
would not have been deemed equivalent at the time of the
amendment."' 3 2

The majority, in Judge Newman's mind, thus

failed to correct the lower court, which had disregarded the fact
that, at the time of the amendment, an aluminum alloy sleeve was
not deemed to be an equivalent to the patented element with
regards to the function that the equivalent was performing. ' To
Judge Newman, in a determination of foreseeability, one should
consider the state of prior art, not subsequent developments in the
art. 134
With respect to the application of the function/way/result test in
the foreseeability determination, Judge Newman explained that
according to the Graver Tank test, "an important factor is whether
persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the
interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with
the one that was," and this factor should control in determining
whether one skilled in the art would have treated an alleged
equivalent foreseeable at the time of the amendment. 35 The
inquiry should be determined using the triple identity test
articulated in Graver Tank.

36

130. Id. at 1384.
13 1. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1384-85 (Newman, J., dissenting).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. Judge Newman stated that majority erred because it relied on
"[respondent's] later equivalent use of an aluminum alloy sleeve to prove that
the non-magnetizable aluminum alloy was a foreseeable equivalent of a
magnetizable metal," at the time the original application was filed. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339
U.S. 605, 609 (1950)).
136. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1385 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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V. ANALYSIS

A. Emergence of a New Propertyof an Aluminum Sleeve,
Unknown at the Time of the Amendment, Is One of the Reasons
Why There Is a Split Between the Majority and the Dissent.
Festo, because of some extraordinary facts, has failed to clarify
the proper application of the doctrine of equivalents and
prosecution history estoppel. Festo did not involve a narrowing
amendment that simply disclosed something that was known in the
prior art. There was an extra wrinkle in the facts that caused a
dilemma for the majority and the dissent. That wrinkle can be best
demonstrated by the following hypothetical. Namely, one can
imagine a situation, where an element present in the prior art, here,
a non-magnetizable sleeve, is thought by one skilled in the art not
to perform the specific function that the element in the patented
device in question performs, here, the shielding of magnetic fields.
That element present in the prior art is thus thought to have
properties that are known at the time of amendment or filing. In
Festo, the properties disclosed in the prior art were unrelated to
magnetic shielding. Time passes and it turns out that what one
skilled in the art thought about the properties of the prior art
element, at the time of amendment, was wrong. In Festo, it turned
out that a non-magnetizable sleeve was in fact able to shield
magnetic fields.
Should the patentee be precluded from
recapturing that element, simply because it was present in the prior
art, but was thought to exhibit different properties?
Before that question is answered in general, one thing has to be
made clear: even if the above question was to be answered in the
negative and the patentee was allowed to reclaim some subject
matter because some of the properties were unknown at the time of
the amendment, that rule still does not help Festo because the
"unknown property" in question was not the function to be
performed by the element in question, the sleeve. Even though the
device in the patent contained a "'small gap'. . . between the piston
and the driven member . . . so that the magnetic coupling force

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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[was] particularly strong,"' 37 the original and independent claim 1
called only for the sleeve to be made of any material.' 38 Thus, the
sleeve was to "enclose the magnets," not "shield the magnetic
field," and a "non-magnetizable sleeve" known in the prior art
could perform that function of enclosing the magnets.'39
Furthermore, the amendment filed by Dr. Stoll did not explain
magnetic qualities of the sleeve, and his response only disclosed
and distinguished two "large gap" German patents. 140

This

suggests that magnetic shielding was to be accomplished by the
"small gap" in the patented device and not by the particular type of
sleeve used to enclose the magnets. Thus, it was reasonable for
the district court to conclude that "because the SMC magnetic
leakage fields are 'very small'.

. .

little shielding is needed [from

the sleeve]."''
Based on the prosecution history, one would
conclude that the shielding was not the function intended to be
performed by the sleeve; therefore, Festo should not be able to
argue that it deserves to recapture the "magnetic sleeve" by
arguing unforeseeability, even if courts allowed recapture in
situations where a property of a particular element was unknown at
the time of the amendment. In Festo, that property simply was not
at issue since the time of filing.
What about a plaintiff who tries to recapture a disclaimed
element because that element performs the very specific function
that the patent requires? What if Festo specifically claimed and
argued for a magnetic sleeve because of the property of shielding
magnetic fields and not just enclosing the magnets? What should
be the approach in that situation? Because this situation would
involve performance of a specific function, i.e. magnetic shielding,
to achieve a particular result, i.e. to maximize the magnetic
coupling, the first thought that comes to mind is that under this
scenario the foreseeability of interchangeable elements in the
patented and allegedly infringing device should be analyzed using
one of the tests for equivalency-the function/way/result, as Festo
argued. Although the Federal Circuit found that to be incorrect,
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1371 (majority opinion).
1382.
1373.
1384.
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the positions of Festo and the dissent on that issue may not be
unreasonable. This is because the Supreme Court, in Festo IV,
failed to provide clear guidance on this issue. 142 The next section
will shed some light on this failure and explain that despite the
ambiguity in the Supreme Court's test, the majority's decision
provides the correct answer to the problem raised in Festo. I
B. The Wording of the Supreme Court's Test, Articulated in Festo
IV, May Have Causedthe Split Between the Majority and the
Dissent as to the Application of the Function/Way/Result Test.
In its opinion, the majority held that foreseeability of an
equivalent does not require any of the tests for equivalency.' 43 The
majority reasoned that the test is specifically designed to determine
whether a device is equivalent, but not to determine whether
prosecution history estoppel applies as a result of a limiting
amendment and furthermore, that application of the triple identity
test in Festo-like cases would lead to the demise of the doctrine of
equivalents because in most cases, at the time of the amendment,
the applicant would not know that the device disclosed in the art
would satisfy the triple identity test.'44 Thus, the device would
always be unforeseeable to one skilled in the art and could
therefore be recaptured using the Supreme Court's test in virtually
all situations.'45 The dissent, on the other hand, argued that failure
to apply the triple identity test in this situation would make the
determination of foreseeability strictly mechanical; foreseeability
would be a simple "matter of law" in situations when the alleged
equivalent was disclosed in prior art, without any regard as to
whether its equivalency was "unknown in fact."' 46 In the
dissenter's view, the majority's rule "further erodes the residue of
142. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722
(2002).

143. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1379.
144. Id. at 1380.
145. Id. Specifically, the court stated that "prosecution history estoppel
would apply only if the applicant in adopting the narrowing amendment was
aware or should have been aware that the equivalent would be an equivalent to
the claimed feature for purposes of the invention as defined by the amended
claim." Id. at 1380-8 1.
146. See id. at 1383-84 (Newman, J., dissenting).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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the doctrine of equivalents, for its foreseeable result is to deprive
amended claims of access to the doctrine of equivalents."' 147 Under
the majority rule, an alleged device, when disclosed in the prior
art, would be foreseeable even though the device would not be
148
considered to be an equivalent by one of ordinary skill in the art.
As Judge Newman stated:
The [majority] now rules that the equivalency of the
[alternative]... was foreseeable as a matter of law,
because [it] previously was known although its
technological equivalency was unknown.
The
panel majority holds that an equivalent is
foreseeable if one skilled in the art would have
known that the alternative existed in the field of art
as defined by the original claim scope, even if the
suitability of the alternative for the particular
purposes defined by the amended claim scope was
unknown. 14
Why such different approaches to the problem? Why does the
dissent urge an application of the doctrine of equivalents under the
facts of this case? As the majority and dissent correctly point out,
it is a well-established principle that determination of equivalence
takes place as of the time of infringement.' 50 Foreseeability, on the
other hand, for the purposes of prosecution history estoppel, as the
Supreme Court's test requires, is determined at the time of drafting
an amendment of the claims.'' At this point, it seems that the
boundaries of these two doctrines are fairly clear and that their
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1383.
Id.
Festo, 493 F.3d at 1383-84 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 19

(1997). The court explicitly stated that "[i]nsofar as the question under the
doctrine is whether an accused element is equivalent to a claimed element, the
proper time for evaluating equivalency-and knowledge of interchangeability
between elements-is at the time of infringement, not at the time the patent was
issued." Id.
151. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,

740 (2002). The first prong in Supreme Court's test explicitly states: "The
equivalent may have been unforeseeable at the time of the application." Id.
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application would not cause problems, even though the application
of one (doctrine of equivalents) necessarily encompasses
application of the other (prosecution history estoppel).'52 The
problem in this case arises because the test articulated by the
Supreme Court inadvertently suggests application of one of these
doctrines in a manner different than urged by these wellestablished principles. Namely, by asking "whether the equivalent
was foreseeable at the time of the amendment" the Supreme Court
may inadvertently invite a determination of equivalency at the time
of the application, or amendment, instead of time of infringement.
The simple presence of the word "equivalent," while perhaps
necessary to indicate what needs to be done for the test to apply,
may result in confusion. Although the Supreme Court may not
have intended such a reading, Judge Newman and many
practitioners did not think it an unreasonable interpretation of
Festo IV 53
'
However, while the presence of the word "equivalent" in the
Supreme Court's test may be explained, some of the Court's
statements complicate the issue even more. At one point in its
decision, the Court states that "[t]he patentee, as the author of the
claim language, may be expected to draft claims encompassing
readily known equivalents."' 54 This statement explicitly requires
the patentee to determine, and include in his patent application,
"known equivalents" at the time of drafting the amendment, and
thus determine equivalency of devices present in the pertinent art
at the time of the application or amendment, contrary to what the
rules of law may require. The problem seems to be compounded
even more by failure of the Supreme Court to articulate explicitly
the correct timing for determination of equivalency for the
purposes of determining foreseeability at the time of the
amendment. This, therefore, explains why the dissent calls for the

152. This is because prosecution history estoppel is a limitation on the extent
to which the doctrine of equivalents can be applied.
153. Apparently, it is not only the dissent that swallows the bait in this case.
Practitioners are also split whether the majority or the dissent had a better
argument in this case. See, e.g., Patently-O, Further Limitations on Doctrine of
Equivalents: Equivalent Foreseeable if Disclosed in Relevant Art,
http://www.patentlyo.com (July 6, 2007).
154. Festo, 535 U.S. at 740.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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application of the triple identity test-it simply follows the
suggestion of that statement: "the patentee, as the author of the
claim language, may be expected to draft claims encompassing
readily known equivalents."
C. The Majority Got It Right
Any reliance on this apparent ambiguity in Festo IV would be
incorrect.' 55
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly
articulate the timing for determining equivalency, it nevertheless
followed, and did not disturb, the guidelines set by WarnerJenkinson. "' There, the Court did, in fact, hold that "[i]nsofar as
the question under the doctrine of equivalents is whether an
accused element is equivalent to a claimed element, the proper
time for evaluating equivalency-and thus knowledge of
interchangeability between elements-is at the time of
infringement, not at the time the patent was issued." '57 Such a rule
was also articulated in many of the Federal Circuit's own opinions
Thus, despite the
involving prosecution history estoppel.'5 8
instances where one might be tempted to read Festo IV to mean
otherwise, namely, that equivalency for prosecution history
estoppel purposes might be determined at the time of amendment,
the Court's decision follows its own precedent in WarnerJenkinson by implicitly holding that equivalency still should be
examined at the time of infringement.'5 9 The Federal Circuit's
155. The ambiguity in the Supreme Court's decision may have been
unavoidable. Because the doctrine of equivalents and the prosecution history
estoppel are interconnected, its hard to imagine a good substitute for the word
"equivalent," especially when the timing of the application of the two doctrines
is different, as in this case.
156. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 733. The court stated that Warner-Jenkinson
reaffirmed the doctrine. Id. The court follows this by affirming that the timing

of determining equivalency is at the time of infringement and not at the tine of
patent application or amendment of the claims.
157. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37
(1997).
158. See, e.g., ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 544 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
159. The lack of explicit analysis in the Court's decision is understandable

because of the issues that were presented to the Court in the case, namely, the
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majority in Festo VII is thus correct in holding that the
function/way/result test does not apply in determining
foreseeability. The triple identity applies only to equivalency, and
that is determined at another time in the analysis--during
infringement. 60
There is yet another reason why the function/way/result or the
insubstantial differences test should not apply in determination of
foreseeability despite any ambiguity in wording of any of the tests.
Even though the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history
estoppel are applied in conjunction with one another, and are
raised in the same cases, as one is a defense to another, they are
still distinct doctrines that should be analyzed independently. 6 1
Thus, in the determination of infringement, the initial burden of
proof rests with the patentee to present a prima facie case of
infringement. 62
' Once the patentee has met this burden, the burden
shifts to the accused infringer to establish a defense.' 6 3
Prosecution history estoppel is one possible defense.1 64 However,
the doctrine only applies once infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents has been successfully raised. This is because one of
the elements of a primafacie case of prosecution history estoppel
is infringement of a claim, found under the doctrine of
equivalents.' 6 5 Thus, in cases invoking the application of the two
doctrines, the doctrine of equivalents must be analyzed first--only
then does prosecution history estoppel come into play.
If
equivalence is not proven, there is no infringement, and the
application and extent of the prosecution history estoppel and not the doctrine of
equivalents.
160. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 37.
161. I do not mean to say that the doctrines should be analyzed in isolation,

but that the tests and rules applicable to one should not govern the other.
162. Cheri M. Taylor, Claim Construction and Proving Infringement, 910
PLIPAT 13, 51 (2007).

163. Id.
164. Armando Irizarry, Harmonizing Prosecution History Estoppel and the
Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Infringement Actions, 5 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 31, 35 (2003).
165. Taylor, supra note 156, at 54. The remaining two elements of the

doctrine are: (2) a narrowing amendment made during prosecution, reexamination or re-issue of a claim; and (3) the narrowing amendment was made
to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act (i.e. overcome a prior art rejection).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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prosecution history estoppel need not be established.
What
follows is that determination of foreseeability is also a moot
issue.' 66 On the other hand, if the primafacie case of equivalence
is made out, i.e. equivalence is found at the time of infringement,
prosecution history estoppel and foreseeability analysis are done
using the information about equivalence that already has been
determined. There is no need for a re-determining of equivalency
at the time of infringement under foreseeability analysis.
This analysis establishes the correctness of the majority's
holding that the function/way/result test, or for that matter, the
insubstantial differences test, does not apply in determining
foreseeability. If the majority held otherwise, as the dissent tried
to argue, courts would attempt a re-analysis of equivalency at the
time of infringement.
Instead, equivalency at the time of
infringement is first properly determined. That information is then
used in the analysis of foreseeability at the time of the narrowing
amendment.
Had the intent of the Supreme Court been
otherwise-had the Supreme Court meant to allow for
determination of equivalency at the time when foreseeability is
also determined as the dissent suggests-the majority would have
explicitly said so, because such a rule would completely revamp
the doctrine of equivalents. Instead, the Court followed the wellestablished cases in the arena.
VI. IMPACT
Because Festo VII is still a very recent opinion, it is unclear
what effect it will have on the doctrine of equivalents and
prosecution history estoppel jurisprudence. The decision appears
as a broad application of foreseeability because of the presumption
that what was present in the prior art should have been foreseeable
to the patentee at the time of the amendment.'6 7 Thus, it is
conceivable
that, as some practitioners
suspected, the
"foreseeable" exception to prosecution history estoppel will apply
only to truly pioneering inventions, meaning that it will only be a
166. Once there is no infringement, both prosecution history estoppel and

foreseeability exception, or any exceptions for that matter, are moot.
167. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d
1368, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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slight upgrade over the "complete bar.""'6 Chances are, however,
that Festo VII will not cause a great turmoil, particularly because it
is still far less radical than the "complete bar" in Festo 111. 69 As
this section will demonstrate, Festo III had much less impact on
the outcome of court cases than initially anticipated.' 0 It is likely
that the latest Federal Circuit's decision will follow the same path.
A. BriefPresentationon the Immediate Effects of Festo III
In Festo III, the Federal Circuit held that when a patentee enters
a narrowing amendment with respect to his claims, he creates a
"complete bar" with respect to the subject matter of the narrowed
claims; he gives up all of the equivalents with respect to the
amended element.' 7' Certainly, that decision can be viewed as
decreasing the chances of the patentees to succeed in infringement
litigation involving the application of the prosecution history
estoppel because, due to a narrowing amendment for the purposes
of patentability, the patentee closes the door to the doctrine of
equivalents and must rely strictly on literal infringement.
Interestingly, however, in the years after Festo Ill, patentees did
not record a diminished rate of success in litigating cases involving
the prosecution history estoppel.' n In fact, "patentees did better
Specifically,
under [seemingly] less-patent friendly rules."'7 3
74
period before Festo III, patentees'
during the "pro-patentee"'
168. Benassi, supra note 14, at 66 ("If the Federal Circuit takes the broad
view ... then it is likely that an unforeseeable equivalent will be rare, and may

only apply an "after arising equivalent" to a truly pioneering invention.").
169. Even if one argues that the foreseeability exception will only apply to
truly pioneering inventions, it is still not a complete bar on equivalents.

170. Allison & Lemley, supra note 9, at 957.
171. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558,
569 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In addition, the Federal Circuit also held that "voluntary
amendments are treated in the same way for purpose of prosecution history
estoppel" and that "unexplained amendments are not entitled to any range of
equivalents." Id. at 558.
172. Allison & Lemley, supra note 9, at 957.
173. Id.
174. Before the complete bar decision, prosecution history estoppel was a
flexible doctrine. It remained flexible even after Warner-Jenkinson introduced
its presumption that unexplained amendments are presumptively made for
purposes of patentability.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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success rate in prosecution estoppel cases involving amended
claims was a mere 12.5%.115 That success rate went up to 21.2%
in the period after Festo III but prior to when Festo IV "relaxed"
the rules.'76 The low numbers of patentee success in these cases
involving prosecution history estoppel, and cases involving strictly
the application of the doctrine of equivalents' 77 only suggest that
the doctrine of equivalents "was already near death by the 1990s,"
That the
far earlier than when Festo III was handed down.'
doctrine of equivalents was "near death" may or may not be true,
but it appears that the success rate of patentees applying
prosecution history estoppel was growing prior to (and continued
Specifically, patentees'
to grow even faster after) Festo IV.'
success rates between February 27, 2004 and August 31, 2005
reached 42.1%. 180 When district court cases are excluded and only
175. Allison & Lemley, supra note 9, at 968.
176. Id. Generally the district courts were more favorable to patentees than
the Federal Circuit. Id. at 967. However, even the Federal Circuit became more
patentee friendly after the "complete bar" decision. See id. Patentees' success
rate almost doubled from 8.8% to 17.2%. Id. at 969.
177. The success rate for patentees strictly with doctrine of equivalents issues
hovered around 27.6% before the "complete bar" and 21.7% in the years
following it. Id. at 966. These numbers, as compared with the numbers in
prosecution history estoppel, actually decreased. See id. at 967.
178. Id. at 958. The authors suggested that the emergence of the Markman
hearings started the demise of the doctrine of equivalents:
Once courts were construing claims as a matter of law pretrial, and finding themselves in a position to resolve virtually
all infringement issues on summary judgment, they were
naturally inclined to decide the doctrine of equivalents issues
too. And a court that has rejected a literal infringement
argument - the only kind of court likely to spend much time
thinking about equivalents issues pre-trial - is unlikely to
undo the work of claim construction by sending the issue of
infringement by equivalents to the jury.
Id. This point is well taken; however, one should not forget that ever since the
Supreme Court's Markman decision and even before that opinion, the Federal
Circuit has reversed Markman determination at an alarmingly high rate, thus
diminishing the effect of bias that district court judges may have developed due
to implementation of the hearings. See id.
179. Id. at968.
180. Id. The authors of this study do not consider this growth in the success
rate to be significant; however, despite the fact that in some areas the numbers
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

31

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6

436

DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW

[Vol. XVIII:405

Federal Circuit dispositions are considered, that number grows to
47.4%."' Thus, while it appears that Festo IV breathed new life
into the doctrine of equivalents by relaxing the rigid standards of
Festo Ill, Festo III itself was not the reason of the doctrine's
earlier downfall.
B. Impact ofFesto
All of this suggests that, barring a Supreme Court
reconsideration of Festo, Festo VII will not have an effect on the
way practitioners approach their cases. Opponents of the decision
can argue, as the dissent did in this case, that this decision "further
erodes the residue of the doctrine of equivalents, for its foreseeable
result is to deprive amended claims of access to the doctrine of
equivalents."182 These opponents can argue that foreseeability will
be deprived of any factual analysis and become a mechanical and
automatic application.183 This argument is erroneous for several
reasons. First, the Federal Circuit did not hold that the presence of
the alleged device in the art at the time of the amendment is
conclusive of foreseeability. Instead, it ruled that a court should
engage in objective analysis, using a variety of factors, to make
that determination of foreseeability.'84 This is what the district
court specifically did in this case; the court considered whether the
use of a "magnetizable sleeve" was foreseeable to one of ordinary
skill in the art and ruled on that issue against Festo.185 Thus,
they provided suggested a doubling of patentee's success rate. Id
181. Allison & Lemley, supra note 9, at 969.
182. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368,

1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
183. Id. at 1384.
184. The court explained:

Because we cannot anticipate all of the circumstances in
which a patentee might rebut the presumption of surrender,
we believe that discussion of the relevant factors encompassed
by each of the rebuttal criteria is best left to development on a
case-by-case basis. However, we provide the following
general guidance, which we apply to the patents in suit below,
regarding the application of the three rebuttal criteria.
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1368-

69 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
185. Festo, 493 F.3d at 1376.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/6
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contrary to the dissenting opinion, the foreseeability presumption
is not a mechanical one, and an alleged equivalent will not be ruled
to be foreseeable just because it can be found in the prior art. The
court will go through the foreseeability analysis using a variety of
factors as it did in the case at bar.
Second, the Federal Circuit's holding that an equivalent that is
present in prior art "should have been foreseeable" is in accord
with earlier controlling decisions; it does not change anything that
the Supreme Court stated or any set principles that were deeply
entrenched in Federal Circuit practice.' 86 Thus, the Federal Circuit
in Festo VII did nothing to prompt critiques that its holding in this
case would have any particular effect on the doctrine of
equivalents. If there was to be such effect, it would have happened
long before Festo VII, particularly after Festo IlI. However,
nothing to that effect happened. In fact, quite the opposite has
occurred as patentees have enjoyed greater success following
Festo IIl.
VII. PUBLIC POLICY V. FESTO
The underlying public policy considerations of the doctrine of
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel are yet other reasons
that support the Federal Circuit's holding that neither applies in
determination of foreseeability. This is despite the fact that both
of these doctrines protect completely opposite interests during the
patent process. Whereas the doctrine of equivalents protects the
patentee by "prevent[ing] the imitation of an otherwise patented
invention where insubstantial changes have been made to
circumvent the patent protection" where literal infringement does
"aluminum sleeve was foreseeable because containing the magnetic leakage
fields was not necessary to serve the purposes of the invention." Id.
186. The Supreme Court in Festo explicitly held that "when ... the patentee
originally claimed the subject matter alleged to infringe but then narrowed the
claim in response to a rejection, he may not argue that the surrendered territory
comprised unforeseen subject matter that should be deemed equivalent to the
literal claims of the issued patent." Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo
Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733-34 (2002). Similarly, the Federal Circuit has
held frequently that "if the alleged equivalent were known in the prior art in the
field of the invention, it certainly should have been foreseeable at the time of the
amendment." Festo, 493 F.3d at 1377.
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not apply,'8 7 the prosecution history estoppel protects "other
players in the marketplace [who] are entitled to rely on the record
made in the Patent Office in determining the meaning and scope of
the patent."' 8 8 Courts, however, resolve the apparent conflict
between the interests involved and apply the two doctrines after
engaging in equitable balancing based on the facts of the case in
question. 8' 9
Festo VII will not change this analysis. Courts should proceed
in their analysis in the same fashion and under the same rules of
law. Nothing has changed in that analysis-there still has to be a
narrowing amendment that excludes from the claims subject
matter, known in the prior art, that is later reclaimed as an
equivalent. There is nothing unfair in charging the patentee with
the burden of knowing what is present in the prior art and what
can be used as a substitute for the element in question, even if
some of its properties are still unknown.
The burden is
considerably lessened by the fact that it only applies when the
patentee tries to recapture the very same element, which was
originally present in his application and which was later
disclaimed by him. A patentee should bear the risk of having full
knowledge of the qualities of all of the elements in his claims
before he decides to disclaim them.
By disclaiming these
elements, the patentee, and only the patentee, is making a
conscious decision about the coverage of his patent. The public,
having only the file wrapper to analyze, should not bear the burden
of answering these questions for the patentee.

187. Clark, supra note 10, at 366. That principle was voiced by the Supreme
Court from the very first time that it addressed the doctrine in cases. See, e.g.,
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 343 (1853) ( "The exclusive right to the thing

patented is not secured, if the public are at liberty to make substantial copies of
it, varying its form or proportions"); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) ( "The essence of the doctrine is that one may
not practice a fraud on a patent"); Festo, 535 U.S. 722, 723 (2002) (explaining
that the doctrine of equivalents ensures appropriate incentives for innovation).
188. Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1254 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (quoting Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1208 (Fed.

Cir. 1992)).
189. See Black & Decker, Inc v. Hoover Serv. Ctr., 886 F.2d 1285, 1295
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 871 n.7
(Fed. Cir. 1985)).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
After 19 years of litigation, two visits to the Supreme Court, two
en banc decisions by the Federal Circuit, and after setting new and
reaffirming old precedent with respect to several issues concerning
the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history estoppel
jurisprudence, Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co. seems to have been finally decided. Although still appealable
to the Supreme Court, Festo seems to have reached the end of its
road because the Federal Circuit simply followed the directions
that it was given. Both the Federal Circuit's careful adherence to
the Supreme Court's directions and the underlying public policy
should prevent the Federal Circuit's decision from being disrupted
again. The final question that needed answering concerned
foreseeability and what necessarily comes with it, specifically with
regard to timing. That question has been answered.
David Dziura
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